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Insider Trading in the Market with Rational
Expected Price
BY FUZHOU GONG, DEQING ZHOU 1
Kyle (1985) builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived
private information submits an optimal order in each period given the market maker’s pricing
rule. An inconsistency exists to some extent in the sense that the “constant pricing rule ”
actually assumes an adaptive expected price with pricing rule given before insider making
the decision, and the “market efficiency” condition, however, assumes a rational expected
price and implies that the pricing rule can be influenced by insider’s strategy. We loosen the
“constant pricing rule ” assumption by taking into account sufficiently the insider’s strategy
has on pricing rule. According to the characteristic of the conditional expectation of the
informed profits, three different models vary with insider’s attitudes regarding to risk are
presented. Compared to Kyle (1985), the risk-averse insider in Model 1 can obtain larger
guaranteed profits, the risk-neutral insider in Model 2 can obtain a larger ex ante expectation
of total profits across all periods and the risk-seeking insider in Model 3 can obtain larger
risky profits. Moreover, the limit behaviors of the three models when trading frequency
approaches infinity are given, showing that Model 1 acquires a strong-form efficiency, Model
2 acquires the Kyle’s (1985) continuous equilibrium, and Model 3 acquires an equilibrium
with information released at an increasing speed.
KEYWORDS: Kyle (1985) model; private information; pricing rule.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE MOTIVATION of our paper is to improve the canonical strategic trading model due to
Kyle (1985). In Kyle (1985), the price adjustment made by market maker is proportional to
1For useful discussions, we thank Hong Liu, Yonghong Liu and Quanli Qin. We are grateful for financial
support for National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.10721101), China’s National 973 Project
(No.2006CB805900) and 985 Project of Business Statistics and Econometrics Platform of Peking University
(No.468-11807-001).
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the total trading volume in which the proportional coefficient λn, named as the pricing rule
(or liquidity parameter, or inverse of market depth), reflects the market maker’s sensitivity
regarding to the total trading volume. A strong assumption is the “constant pricing rule”,
which means that the insider takes the pricing rule as a constant and thus ignores the effect
her strategy has on it. We loosen this assumption by taking into account sufficiently the
effect that insider’s choice might have on pricing rule.
The “constant pricing rule” is not only just a “very strong” assumption, but also can
induce to some extent an inconsistency in Kyle (1985). In fact, the (semi-strong) market
efficiency condition implies that the pricing rule λn dose can be affected by insider’s submis-
sion. In other words, the constant pricing rule announced by market maker is untrustable
in an semi-strong efficient market. Accordingly, the insider has an incentive to deviate from
the optimal strategy depicted in Kyle (1985) to make a more profitable strategy since she
know the market maker would adjust the price to the deviated strategy to satisfy the market
efficiency condition. Thus, a new equilibrium arises in which the insider’s strategy can be
characterized in a more reasonable manner.
An interesting specific case is the one period Kyle model, where equilibrium is the same
whether with the constant pricing rule assumption or not. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
point out this coincidence when they investigate the clustering phenomena in a model with
short lived private information. Generally, in each period except the last one in a multi-
ple periods model, as long as the insider takes market maker’s response into account, the
conditional expectation of profits over the remaining periods, as a random variance, has no
maximum any more since the risky profits and guaranteed profits that constitute the con-
ditional expectation cannot attain their maximums simultaneously. Hence we present three
different models varies with the maximization manner. Model 1 focuses on the risk-averse
insider who maximizes the guaranteed profits firstly and then, if multiple solutions are ob-
tained, chooses among them the one that maximizes the risky profits. Insider in Model 2
is risk-neutral, trying to maximize the ex ante expectation of total profits. While Model 3
assumes a risk-seeking insider who maximizes the profits in an order reverse to that in Model
1.
In Model 1 with a risk-averse insider, when trading happens indefinitely frequently, the
private information is incorporated into price almost immediately, thus in limit Model 1
presents a “strong efficient” market that defined by Fama (1970) as one with prices reflecting
both public and private information. This result is analogous to Holden and Subrahamanyam
(1992) with multiple perfectly informed traders. However, there is only one insider in Model 1
and the source of this result is risk aversion, not like theirs - the aggressive competition among
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insiders. Chau and Vayanos (2008) also obtain a strong form efficiency with one insider
when trading happens frequently. Their conclusion depends crucially on the combination
of impatience and stationarity. While in our model, there are no such assumptions since in
Model 1 the insider receives the information by one time and there exist no channels such
like time discounting, the public revelation and the obsolescence of private information that
generate cost linked to impatience. Last but not least, compared to Kyle (1985), risk-averse
insider in Model 1 obtains greater guaranteed profits at the cost of smaller risky profits
estimated at the beginning of trading.
Model 2 shows that the risk-neutral insider transfers her information to public price
gradually when trading happens frequently. In discrete time case, by producing a more
profitable market depth, the insider is able to obtain a larger ex ante expectation of total
profits across all periods than that in Kyle (1985). In the limit as the number of trading
periods becomes infinity, however, the insider cannot be rewarded by additional ability of
affecting the pricing rule. In fact, the difference in equilibriums between Model 2 and Kyle
(1985) is disappearing as trading frequency is growing, since that in limit the constant
liquidity parameter given by market maker in Kyle (1985) is exactly the one the insider
would like to choose provided her with such discretion.
In Model 3, the risk-seeking insider has an incentive to postpone trades to the future
to create greater risk in future profits. Thus, strategic trading in Model 3 is in sharp
contrast with those in Model 1, 2 and Kyle (1985) in that, insider prefers to the trading
pattern with less information released early on and greater information revealed latter to
keep information advantage as long as possible. Moreover, Model 3 allows an increasing
liquidity parameter through trades, consistent with the results motivated by the “rat race”
effect in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) with competitive insiders endowed with negatively
correlated information.
There are large numbers of literature extending Kyle’s (1985) strategic trading model.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) consider the competition among multiple insiders each
endowed with perfect private information. While Foster and Viswanathan (1996) study the
competition with heterogenous private signals. Huddart Hughes and Levine (2001) examine
the case where insider must announce her trading volume after the submission while Hud-
dart and Hughes (2004) study the case with pre-announcement of insider trade. Recently,
Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) study the extended Kyle model with insider observing a
signal that tracts the evolution of asset’s fundamental value and with a random public an-
nouncement time revealing the current value of asset. A common characterization is that
they all inherit the Kyle assumption that the risk-neutral insider considers liquidity param-
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eter as a constant given by market maker. Although several papers such like Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1994), Baruch (2002) and Zhang (2004) extend Kyle model to accomodate
risk-averse insider, still they remain the constant pricing rule assumption unchanged. Hence,
our new improvements on Kyle model by considering both the possibility of insider’s effect
on pricing rule and of the insider’s risk different attitudes might have potential applications
on various models based on Kyle (1985).
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our three models based
on analysis of Kyle (1985). Section 3 focuses on Model 1, deriving the sequential auction
equilibrium in discrete time setting, showing the limit results when the trading period number
goes to infinity, and illustrating the endogenous parameters numerically. Section 4 and
section 5 are devoted to Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. Finally, section 6 makes some
concluding comments.
2. ANALYSIS ABOUT KYLE (1985) MODEL AND PRESENTATION OF
OUR MODELS
2.1. Basic Notations
We conform to the notation of Kyle (1985). A risky asset has a liquidation value v,
normally distributed with mean p0 and variance σ
2
v . The asset is traded in N sequential
moments {tn}n=1,··· ,N with tn = n∆tN and ∆tN = 1/N . The market participants are insider,
market maker and noise traders. The insider knows the true value v and she submits trading
volume xn in the nth period, with her profits in the nth period denoted by πn. Noise traders’
total demand in the nth period denoted by un is exogenously-generated, normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance σ2u∆tN in the N periods model. Market maker observes the total
trading volume yn = xn + un prior to the nth auction, and then absorbs it at price pn. An
important assumption following Kyle (1985) in our paper is that pn satisfies
Assumption 1. (Semi-strong) Market Efficiency:
pn = E[v|y1, y2, · · · , yn] for n = 1, 2, ..., N.(2.1)
Before presenting our new models, we analyze the roles played by assumption 1 and the
“constant pricing rule” assumption in Kyle (1985) .
2.2. The Constant Pricing Rule Assumption in Kyle (1985)
To find an equilibrium, Kyle gives three assumptions -market efficiency, profit maximiza-
tion and “constant pricing rule” assumption in definition “linear equilibrium” (page 1321).
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We examine the last assumption carefully and attempt to find out how it works in searching
of the equilibrium. Before fixing the optimal value for strategy xn at the nth period, Kyle
claims, in a linear equilibrium, pn is given by
pn = pn−1 + λn(xn + un) + h,(2.2)
where h is some linear function of x1 + u1, · · · , xn−1 + un−1 (page 1324). And then, λn is
regarded as a constant independent with insider’s strategy xn in Kyle’s following deduction:
max
xn
{(v − pn−1 − λnxn − h)xn + αn(v − pn−1 − λnxn − h)2 + αnλ2nσ2u∆tn + δn}
⇒
xn =
1− 2αnλn
2λn(1− αnλn)(v − pn−1 − h).
Clearly, by assuming the constant pricing rule in definition “linear equilibrium”, the insider
treats pricing rule λn as unrelated to her choice.
2.3. The Strategy Space in Kyle (1985)
It appears that in Kyle’s model, insider’s strategy is chosen from the space consists of
functions measurable to information available to him. However, careful examination shows
that a good property about xn is actually used before its value being fixed. In fact, (2.2)
can hold only in the following deduction:
pn = pn−1 + pn − pn−1
= pn−1 + E[v − pn−1|y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, yn] (by “market efficiency” assumption)
= pn−1 + λnyn + h(y1, · · · , yn−1) (by normality of x1, ..., xn).
If x1, · · · , xn are not gaussian, the expression of pn (2.2) cannot be certainly ensured.1 The
conditional expectation in the above, usually as a nonlinear measurable function of x1 +
u1, · · · , xn + un, is hard to get an explicit expression. Subsequently, the cumulative profits
(ie., Eq.(3.24) in page 1324) satisfying
E[
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v]
= (v − E(v|x1 + u1, · · · , xn + un)) + αn(v −E(v|x1 + u1, · · · , xn + un))2 + δn
1 Even if we suppose x1, · · · , xn ∈ L2(Ω,Fn, P ) with Fn = σ{x1 + u1, · · · , xn + un, v}, (2.2) needs
not hold. Generally, by definition of conditional expectation (Kallenberg, Olav (2002), page 103, 104),
E[v|x1 + u1, · · · , xn + un] is just an orthogonal Hilbert space projection of v onto the linear subspace
L2(Ω,Fn, P ).
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is not an explicit function of xn any more and thus the maximization problem cannot be
solved. Eventually, all relationships that build upon the method of backward induction will
no longer hold. In conclusion, insider’s strategy in Kyle (1985) model is actually chosen from
the gaussian space.
2.4. An Inconsistency Implied in Kyle model
Given gaussian strategy in each period, we know the orders y1, y2, · · · , yn are normally
distributed variables. The orthogonalization of y1, y2, · · · , yn produces:
y˜1, y˜2, · · · , y˜n
in which y˜i = yi −
i−1∑
k=1
cov(yi,yk)
cov(yk ,yk)
yk represents the surprise in the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) total trading
volume. The assumption of market efficiency (2.1) implies
pn − pn−1 =E(v − pn−1|y1, · · · , yn) = E(v − pn−1|y˜1, · · · , y˜n) = E(v − pn−1|y˜n).
Thus
pn − pn−1 = λny˜n with λn = βnΣn−1
βn
2Σn−1 + σ2u∆tN
.(2.3)
Obviously, the informed submission xn does affect the pricing rule through the trading in-
tensity βn. Thus, an inconsistency yields between the implications of the “market efficiency”
assumption and of the “constant pricing rule”.
In a semi-strong efficient market, insider with the gaussian strategy (thus, (2.3) holds.)
has an incentive to deviate from the “optimal strategy” depicted in the equilibrium of Kyle
(1985) to create a more profitable pricing rule. To maintain the market efficiency, the market
maker would adjust the price according to the new strategy insider will choose. Interestingly,
for Kyle’s one period model, equilibrium is the same whether or not the insider ignores the
effect her strategy on pricing rule. Admati and Pfleiderer (1998) also notice this virtue
possessed by the one period Kyle model. This coincidence, when N = 1, is equivalent to the
fact that Kyle’s equilibrium satisfies
λ
′
1(β1) = 0.(2.4)
However, for a general period number such as N = 2, (2.4) does not hold any more.
PROPORSITION 1. In equilibrium of the two periods Kyle (1985) model, the pricing
rule in the first period satisfies
λ
′
1(β1) > 0.(2.5)
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Proposition 1 shows that in the first period of the two periods model, those informed
submissions around the optimum in Kyle (1985) have positive effect on the pricing rule.
2.5. Presentation of Our Models
Note that σ{y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, v} = σ{y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, v−pn−1} since the price pn−1, satis-
fying (2.1), is measurable to the historical information y1, y2, · · · , yn−1. Thus, each gaussian
strategy xn measurable to σ{y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, v} has the following form:
xn = βn(v − pn−1) + bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) + cn(2.6)
in which βn, cn ∈ R and bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) is a linear function of y1, · · · , yn−1. Under assump-
tion (2.1), the following proposition characterizes the profits of insider with any submission
(2.6).
PROPORSITION 2. Under assumption (2.1), when insider adopts strategies such as
(2.6), there exist non-random real numbers αn−1, hn−1, δn−1, n = 1, 2, · · · , N + 1, such that
E(
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v) = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + hn−1(v − pn−1) + δn−1,(2.7)
where
αn−1 = αn(1− λnβn)2 + βn(1− λnβn),(2.8)
hn−1 = (bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) + cn + hn)(1− λnβn),(2.9)
δn−1 = δn + αnλ2nσ
2
u∆tN .(2.10)
with αN = hN = δN = 0 and λn satisfying (2.3). In (2.6), the submission structured on
historical information bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) and insider’s average submission cn can affect the
conditional profits (2.7) only through the term hn−1(v − pn−1). Moreover, bn(y1, · · · , yn−1)
and cn cannot affect any of Σk, λk, or pk with 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
Proposition 2 shows that, in the nth period, the submission structured on common knowl-
edge bn(y1, y2, · · · , yn−1) + cn yields zero profits in ex ante expectation. Moreover, when in-
sider chooses bn(y1, y2, · · · , yn−1) + cn unbounded and the other parameters bounded in her
plan, then at the case v−pn−1 > 0(< 0), her conditional profits (loss) will be unbounded. To
avoid the technical trouble with thus strategies that always yield zero profits in ex ante ex-
pectation and can yield infinite profits in absolute value, we consider a limited strategy space
on insider. That is, the space of strategies constructed on the estimation error v−pn−1 which
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represents the totally unrevealed information in the sense it is independent with historical
information y1, y2, · · · , yn−1 and thus exclusively known to the insider:
Xn = {βn(v − pn−1)|βn ∈ R}.(2.11)
(2.11) is actually the strategy space that contains the “optimal” informed strategy depicted
in Kyle(1985). Note that xn ∈ Xn implies y˜n = yn in (2.3), and this will be used throughout
the rest of the article.
As shown by (2.7) and (2.9), insider with strategy xn ∈ Xn acquires profits accumulated
from the nth period to the end:
E(
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v) = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1.(2.12)
The optimal strategy βn(v−pn−1) , or equivalently, βn, should be determined in equilibrium
by profit-maximization principle. However, generally, (2.12) has no maximization due to
the partial ordering among conditional expectations and thus directly maximizing (2.12) is
meaningless. Note that insider’s conditional profits consist of two different terms, the risky
profits αn−1(v − pn−1)2 as the source of risk, and guaranteed profits δn−1 that cannot be
affected by the realization of v or pn−1. Naturally, three models, each with the Assumption
1 and a different profit-maximization principle stated by Assumption 2 are presented.
Assumption 2. Profit Maximization: At the nth (1 ≤ n ≤ N) period, with the informed
strategy space (2.11) and the informed profits (2.12),
• Model 1 (the risk-averse insider model): the insider firstly maximizes the guaranteed
profit
max
βn
δn−1,
and secondly she maximizes the risky profits
max
βn∈{argmax δn−1}
αn−1(v − pn−1)2.
• Model 2 (the risk-neutral insider model): the insider maximizes the ex ante expectation
max
βn
E(
N∑
k=n
πk).
• Model 3 (the risk-seeking insider model): the insider firstly maximizes the risky profit
max
βn
αn−1(v − pn−1)2,
and secondly she maximizes the guaranteed profit
max
βn∈{argmax αn−1(v−pn−1)2}
δn−1.
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3. MODEL 1: THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE RISK-AVERSE INSIDER
MODEL
3.1. The Discrete Equilibrium
Theorem 1 characterizes a sequential auction equilibrium with endogenous parameters
expressed by a difference equation system.
THEOREM 1. In Model 1 with trading period number N , a subgame perfect linear equi-
librium exists. In this equilibrium, there are real numbers βn, λn, αn and Σn, such that
xn = βn(v − pn−1),(3.1)
pn − pn−1 = λnyn,(3.2)
Σn = var(v|y1, y2, · · · , yn),(3.3)
E(
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v) = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1.(3.4)
The above real numbers βn, αn and Σn can be represented as:
δn = anσu∆tN
1/2Σn
1/2 (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1),(3.5)
αn = bnσu∆tN
1/2Σn
−1/2 (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1),(3.6)
βn = cnσu∆tN
1/2Σn−1−1/2 (n = 1, 2, · · · , N).(3.7)
in which the sequences {an}, {bn}, {cn}, subject to terminal values aN−1 = 0, bN−1 = 12 ,
cN = 1, are given recursively:
an−1 = an(
1
c2n + 1
)1/2 + bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2c2n,(3.8)
bn−1 = bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2 +
cn
c2n + 1
,(3.9)
cn = (
2bn − an
an + bn
)1/2,(3.10)
where cn > 0, n = 1, 2, · · · , N .
PROOF: The proof is by backward induction. The problem in the last period is choosing
the optimal strategy xN = βN(v − pN−1) or equivalently, βN , in the maximization problem:
(3.11)
max
βN
E[πN |p1, · · · , pN−1, v] = max
βN
E[xN (v − pN)|y1, · · · , yN−1, v]
= max
βN
E[xN (v − pN−1 − λNyN)|y1, · · · , yN−1, v]
= max
βN
βN(1− λNβN)(v − pN−1)2
= max
βN
βNσ
2
u∆tN
β2NΣN−1 + σ2u∆tN
(v − pN−1)2.
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As seen from (3.11), with the amount of information available Σ
1/2
N−1 and the estimation error
v − pN−1, the insider will choose the maximizing value
βN =
√
σ2u∆tN
ΣN−1
.
Thus, (3.4) holds when n = N with
αN−1 =
1
2
√
σ2u∆tN
ΣN−1
, δN−1 = 0.
In general, if in the n+ 1th period, insider’s optimal strategy βn+1 supports profits
E[
N∑
k=n+1
πk|p1, · · · , pn, v] = αn(v − pn)2 + δn
with
δn = anσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
1/2
n , αn = bnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n , βn+1 = cn+1σu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n .(3.12)
Then, any informed submission xn = βn(v − pn−1) can expect to yield
(3.13)
E[
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, · · · , pn−1, v] = E[
N∑
k=n+1
πk + xn(v − pn)|y1, · · · , yn−1, v]
= αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1
with
αn−1 = αn(1− λnβn)2 + βn(1− λnβn),(3.14)
δn−1 = δn + αnλ2nσ
2
u∆tN .(3.15)
Additionally, by definitions, we have
λn =
βnΣn−1
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
,(3.16)
Σn =
Σn−1σ2u∆tN
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
.(3.17)
Further, another relationship follows from (3.16) and (3.17):
Σn = (1− λnβn)Σn−1.(3.18)
Substituting (3.12) (3.18) and (3.16) into (3.14) and into (3.15) respectively yields αn−1 and
δn−1 in expression of βn
(3.19)
αn−1(βn) = bnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n (1− λnβn)2 + βn(1− λnβn) by (3.14) and (3.12),
= bnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n−1 (
σ2u∆tN
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
)3/2 +
βnσ
2
u∆tN
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
by (3.18) and (3.16) ,
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(3.20)
δn−1(βn) = anσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
1/2
n + bnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n λ
2
nσ
2
u∆tN by (3.14) and (3.12),
= anσ
2
u∆tN(
Σn−1
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
)1/2 + bnβ
2
nσ
2
u∆tN (
Σn−1
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
)3/2 by (3.18) and (3.16) .
Therefore, solving max
βn
δn−1(βn) yields: when 2bn − an > 0, an ≥ 0, bn ≥ 0 and an + bn > 0
(since calculation shows the FOC and SOC require cn(an + bn) > 0),
βn = ±
√
2bn − an
an + bn
σu∆t
1/2
N
Σ
1/2
n−1
.
Due to the fact that
αn−1(
√
2bn − an
an + bn
σu∆t
1/2
N
Σ
1/2
n−1
) > αn−1(−
√
2bn − an
an + bn
σu∆t
1/2
N
Σ
1/2
n−1
),
the negative βn is excluded. Thus, for n, (3.7) with (3.10) holds. Moreover, substituting (3.7)
into (3.19), we find αn−1 = bn−1σu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n−1 with bn−1 satisfying (3.9). While substituting
(3.7) into (3.20) yields δn−1 = an−1σu∆t
1/2
N Σ
1/2
n−1 with an−1 satisfying (3.8).
The difference equation system (3.8) (3.9) and (3.10) gives a unique solution for sequences
{an}, {bn} and {cn} with terminal value aN−1, bN−1 and cN . In fact, if an, bn and cn+1 are
fixed, then (3.10) yields cn, and in turn, substituting cn into (3.8) yields an−1, and into (3.9)
yields bn−1.
At last, verify the conditions 2bn − an > 0, an ≥ 0, bn ≥ 0 and an + bn > 0 as follows. In
the last periods, these conditions hold since aN−1 = 0, bN−1 = 12 . Suppose for a general n,
theses conditions hold, then from the above proof, (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) with cn > 0 can
be acquired and substituting them into 2bn−1 − an−1 yields
2bn−1 − an−1 = ( 1
c2n + 1
)3/2[(2bn − an(c2n + 1)) + 2cn(c2n + 1)1/2 − bnc2n] =
2cn
c2n + 1
> 0.
Further,
bn−1 = bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2 +
cn
c2n + 1
> 0, an−1 = an(
1
c2n + 1
)1/2 + bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2c2n > 0,
and an−1 + bn−1 > 0 is obvious. In conclusion, these conditions hold and hence Theorem 1
is proved. Q.E.D.
Recall that in Kyle (1985), insider’s optimal submission depends the value of λn an-
nounced by market maker. In equilibrium of Model 1, however, it is expressed explicitly as
proportional to the product of amount of camouflage and inverse of information available
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σu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n−1 , involving no pricing rule λn. On the other hand, like Kyle (1985), inspect-
ing insider’s profits shows that both the expectation of risky profits αn−1(v − pn−1)2 and
guaranteed profits δn−1 are proportional to the product of amount of camouflage and infor-
mation available σu∆t
1/2
N Σ
1/2
n−1. And inspecting the other parameters shows, if σu doubles,
then αn, βn, δn double, Σn by (3.17) is unaffected and λn by (3.16) halves. Additionally, the
SOC cn > 0 rules out the strategies trading inversely on private information which are also
not present in Kyle (1985).
As seen from (3.7), the trading intensity sequence {βn} is increasing over nearly all
trading rounds for two reasons. (i) By (3.17), the information available Σ
1/2
n−1 is decreasing
over trading, and thus the insider needs to trade more intensively to reveal the private
information when it is of less scale. (ii) As will be shown, cn is increasing with n when
n < N . This is consistent with the decreasing concern about the effect current trades has
on the future with time going on. Literatures examining the increasing trading intensities
usually notice the second reason but ignore the first one, might because trading intensities
in Kyle (1985) are expressed less explicitly than us.
As to the relationship between the insider’s strategy and her profits, equation (3.10) gives
some intuitive insights. A simple calculation shows, the insider’s trading intensity coefficient
cn is increasing with bn/an i.e., the ratio of marginal guaranteed profits to marginal risky
profits estimated in the next ( n + 1th ) period. Thus, if an is relatively large, then the
insider has an incentive to trade less currently to keep more information for the next period
since she has a large ability to acquire high guaranteed profits in the next period.
A special case can be solved easily is the two periods case. Firstly, recall that Kyle
(1985) model has an equilibrium when N=2 (see Huddart etal., (2001, Proposition 1)), with
endogenous parameters added an upper index (0) to distinguish from those in our models,
satisfying
α
(0)
0 ≈ 0.7495Σ0−1/2σu∆tN 1/2, δ(0)0 ≈ 0.1281Σ01/2σu∆tN 1/2.(3.21)
Whereas in Model 1 with endogenous parameters added an upper index (1), we have:
α
(1)
0 = [
1
2
(
1
3
)3/2 +
√
2
3
]Σ0
−1/2σu∆tN
1/2 < α
(0)
0 , δ
(1)
0 = (
1
3
)3/2Σ0
1/2σu∆tN
1/2 > δ
(0)
0 .
Clearly, compared to Kyle (1985), the insider can expect to obtain increased guaranteed
profits at the cost of decreased risky profits at the beginning of trading. For a general
N > 2, to examine how the unrevealed information Σn, the liquidity parameter λn and the
trading intensity βn perform, we need to resort to the numerical method, before that, the
limit results when N →∞ can give some important theoretical guidance.
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3.2. The Limit Behavior When N →∞
Denote [Nt] the integral part of Nt. Taken sequence {cn} for example, let t > 0, the
value lim
∆tN→0
c[Nt] corresponds to the continuous version of this sequence at time t. Another
kind of limit we are interested in is lim
∆tN→0
cn with a holden n, characterizing what happens
just after the beginning of trading. The former class of limits is called the “first class of
limits”, and the latter is called the “second class of limits” in Holden and subrahmanyam
(1992). To start the work, the following proposition establishes some preliminary results for
the main results.
PROPORSITION 3. The sequence {cn} in Theorem 1 can be achieved as follows. Given
cn and cn−1, cn−2 is determined by the unique root in (0, 1) of equation
(c2n + 1)(2− c2n−2)c3n−1 = 2(1 + c2n−1)1/2cnc2n−2(3.22)
with terminal values cN−1 =
√
2, cN = 1. Moreover, the following monotonicity holds:
cN−1 > cN−2 > · · · , cn > cn−1 > c2 > c1.(3.23)
bn has a representation of cn and cn−1
bn =
cn(c
2
n + 1)
1/2(2− c2n−1)
3c2n−1
,(3.24)
and also does an
an =
2− c2n
c2n + 1
bn.(3.25)
Based on Proposition 3, we obtain all endogenous parameters’ limits when trading fre-
quency goes to infinity as well as the speeds of convergence with which the limits are ob-
tained.2
THEOREM 2. When N →∞ (equivalently, ∆tN → 0), the sequences {an}, {bn}, {cn} in
Theorem 1 have limits:
lim
N→∞
c[Nt] = 0,(3.26)
lim
N→∞
b[Nt] =∞,(3.27)
lim
N→∞
a[Nt] =∞,(3.28)
2In fact, continuous versions for discrete parameters often take values 0 or ∞, singly providing little for
depiction of the realistic situation with frequent but not continuous trading. While when combined with the
convergence speeds, they can make a closer estimation for the realistic situation.
13
for any t ∈ (0, 1). Moreover
lim
N→∞
c[Nt]
∆tN
1/4
= (
2
3
1
1− t)
1/4,(3.29)
lim
N→∞
b[Nt]∆tN
1/4 = (
2
3
)3/4(1− t)1/4,(3.30)
lim
N→∞
a[Nt]∆tN
1/4 = 2 ∗ (2
3
)3/4(1− t)1/4,(3.31)
and the limits of cn, bn and an with n holden when N →∞ correspond to t = 0 respectively
in above results.
The unrevealed information Σn satisfies, for any t ∈ (0, 1],
lim
N→∞
Σ[Nt] = 0(3.32)
with
Σ0exp{−ln(1 + c2N−1)∆tN−1} < Σ[Nt] < Σ0exp{−ln(1 + c21)∆tN−1}.(3.33)
The liquidity parameter λn satisfies, for a holden n,
lim
N→∞
λn =∞,(3.34)
and for any t ∈ (0, 1],
lim
N→∞
λ[Nt] = 0.(3.35)
The trading intensity βn satisfies, for a holden n,
lim
N→∞
βn = 0,(3.36)
and for any t ∈ (0, 1],
lim
N→∞
β[Nt] =∞.(3.37)
Estimated at the beginning of trading, Model 1 in limit implies infinity guaranteed profits
and zero risky profits since Theorem 2 shows that an and bn with n holden are of order ∆t
−1/4
N
in (3.5) and (3.6). Thus the results in the two periods case are confirmed.
Now, examine the limit behaviors of the endogenous parameters- unrevealed information,
liquidity parameter and trading intensity. The first class of limits of unrevealed information
sequence (3.32) shows that the private information is dissipated immediately (in an arbitrary
small time horizon). Thus the strong-form efficiency characterized by Fama (1970) can be
realized within any positive time t when trading happens continuously. Inequality (3.33)
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indicates that when N increases, prices incorporate the fundamental value at an exponential
speed. (3.37) says, the trading intensity goes to infinity at any calendar time t > 0. While
the second class of limits (3.36) shows that in the initial periods, the insider trades little on
private information. It is striking that the initial low trading intensities (or expected trading
volumes3) can eliminate most information asymmetry so quickly. This stems from the fact
that the market maker responses to every unit of the order extremely sensitively in initial
periods, as shown by (3.34). By contrast, by (3.35), at any positive calendar time t when
market maker has lost the high sensitivity due to the little scale of unrevealed information,
the insider would like to trade extremely aggressively on her information.
These results are similar to those of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) model with
competitive risk-neutral insiders and are in substantial contrast to those of the Kyle (1985)
with a single insider. Chau and Vayanos (2008) also establishes a monopolistic insider
trading model in which the market obtains a strong form efficiency when trading frequency
is sufficiently large. In their model, with stationary in the pattern of information arrival,
the insider chooses to trade quickly to avoid costs linked to impatience generated by time-
discounting, public revelation of information or mean-reverting profitability. Unlike them,
the strong form efficiency in our model is motivated by the risk aversion of insider. Moreover,
recall that in Chau and Vayanos (2008) (also in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) after an
endogenous time) , the insider can earn positive profits even when ∆tN → 0, since although
the market maker’s estimation error goes to zero, the insider can compensate this by trading
infinitely intensively on the new private information flowing in. In our model, however,
the market maker’s estimation error goes to zero at an exponential speed, larger than the
polynomial speed at which the insider speeds up her trading, and thus insider’s profits vanish
very soon.
3.3. Numerical Results
To illustrate Model 1 numerically, we consider the model’s implication in a variety of
settings. We are interested in how information is released through trading, how the insider’s
trading intensity changes through time, how the market maker adjusts price in response to
the order flow, and how lengthening the number of trading periods affects some of these
parameters.
The specific parameterization that we choose is Σ0 = 1, σu = 0.5 and this is also the
3Indeed, E 12 |xn| = 1√2piβn
√
Σn−1. Therefore, when N is large enough, for a holden n, E
1
2 |xn| ≈
1√
2pi
(23 )
1/4(∆tN )
3/4 and for any t > 0, E 12 |x[Nt]| ≈ 1√2pi ( 23(1−t) )1/4(∆tN )3/4. Thus the initial periods possess
relatively low expected trading volumes.
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(a) Unrevealed information Σn with changing pe-
riod numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=1000.
Figure 1: (Model 1) Numeric solutions of the unrevealed information Σn with one unit of
initial variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
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(a) Liquidity parameter λn with changing period
numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=1000.
Figure 2: (Model 1) Numeric solutions of the liquidity parameter λn with one unit of initial
variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
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(a) Intensity trading on private information βn with
changing period numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=50.
Figure 3: (Model 1) Numeric solutions of the intensity trading on private information βn
with one unit of initial variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all
periods.
initialization for the other two models’ simulations. Figures 1, 2, and 3 plot Σn, λn and βn
respectively with the trading time horizon fixed between commencement t = 0 and end of
trading t = 1. Among them, the subfigures 1(a), 2(a), and 3(a) plot for different values
of period number N , while the other subfigures 1(b), 2(b), and 3(b) show the comparison
between discrete model results and their approximations calculated from the corresponding
limit results.
Figure 1(a) shows the evolution of unrevealed information Σn. For each trading number
N , Σn declines to zero very rapidly through time and as the number of periods increases, the
dropping speed increases dramatically. In fact, when N = 100, by the 7th period, more than
percent 95 information asymmetry has been eliminated. Thus, the risk-averse insider prefers
to the trading pattern with trading concentrated at initial periods to diminish the risk in
future profits. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) also examine this trading pattern numerically,
stemming from the “rat race” effect among competitive insiders with high correlated private
signals. By contrast, in Model 1, it is the risk aversion that motivates this pattern, which
applies even with a monopolistic insider setting.
Figure 2(a) investigates how the market maker responses to the order flow. The high
information asymmetry implies a high adverse selection early on and the following little
unrevealed information implies a low adverse selection latter. As the number of trading
rounds increasing, the contrast of adverse selections between the early and the later rounds
17
is more marked since the higher value for the early rounds and lower for the later is producing
a more dramatic decline.
Figure 3(a) shows that βn evolves in a manner contrary to those of Σn and λn. For each
period number N , βn is increasing through all trading periods. As mentioned earlier, this
stems from the decreasing information available and the decreasing concern for the effect
of current trading on future profits. Moreover, for large N , insider’s trading on private
information is more intense, with a sharper increase and a higher terminal value.
At last, figures 1(b), 2(b), 3(b) show that when N is large sufficient (N=1000, 1000, 50
respectively), the limit results obtained by asymptotic analysis can give a good characteri-
zation to the actual discrete results.
4. MODEL 2: THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE RISKY-NEUTRAL INSIDER
MODEL
4.1. The Discrete Equilibrium
Different with Model 1 in profit-maximization manner, insider in Model 2 treats the risky
profits and guaranteed profits equally by maximizing the sum of their ex ante expectations.
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium in discrete case of Model 2.
THEOREM 3. In Model 2 with trading period number N , a subgame perfect equilibrium
exists. In this equilibrium, there are real numbers βn, λn, αn and Σn, such that:
xn = βn(v − pn−1),(4.1)
pn − pn−1 = λnyn,(4.2)
Σn = var(v|y1, y2, · · · , yn),(4.3)
E(
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v) = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1.(4.4)
The above real numbers βn, αn and Σn can be represented as:
δn = anσu∆tN
1/2Σn
1/2 (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1),(4.5)
αn = bnσu∆tN
1/2Σn
−1/2 (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1),(4.6)
βn = cnσu∆tN
1/2Σn−1
−1/2 (n = 1, 2, · · · , N).(4.7)
in which the sequences {an}, {bn}, {cn}, with terminal values aN−1 = 0, bN−1 = 12 , cN = 1,
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are given recursively:
an−1 = an(
1
c2n + 1
)1/2 + bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2c2n,(4.8)
bn−1 = bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2 +
cn
c2n + 1
,(4.9)
an + bn =
1− c2n
cn(1 + c2n)
1/2
,(4.10)
where cn > 0, n = 1, 2, · · · , N .
Compared with Theorem 1 in Model 1, the only difference literally is insider’s strategy
formulation (4.10). Inspecting it shows the insider’s trading intensity coefficient cn is a
decreasing function of an + bn. This means that if insider has more ability to earn the ex
ante expectation of future profits that cumulated from the next period to the end, then she
will trade less aggressively at the current period to keep more information advantage for the
next period.
Specifically, as in Model 1, we investigate the two periods case for Model 2 (with endoge-
nous parameters added an upper index (2)) and compare our results to those of Kyle (1985)
(with endogenous parameters added an upper index (0)). By (3.21), the ex ante expectation
of profits in Kyle (1985) satisfies
E[
2∑
i=1
π
(0)
i ] = α
(0)
0 Σ0 + δ
(0)
0 ≈ 0.8776Σ1/20 σu∆tN 1/2.
In Model 2, the endogenous parameters result in a larger ex ante expectation of profits, i.e.,
E[
2∑
i=1
π
(2)
i ] = α
(2)
0 Σ0 + δ
(2)
0 > E[
2∑
i=1
π
(0)
i ]
with
α
(2)
0 ≈ 0.7385Σ−1/20 σu∆tN 1/2, δ(2)0 ≈ 0.1416Σ1/20 σu∆tN 1/2.
Moreover, we have,
β
(2)
1 > β
(0)
1 , β
(2)
2 > β
(0)
2 , Σ
(2)
1 < Σ
(0)
1 , Σ
(2)
2 < Σ
(0)
2 , λ
(2)
1 > λ
(0)
1 , λ
(2)
2 < λ
(0)
2 .
Thus, the insider trades more aggressively, reveals more information, and induces a higher
adverse selection in the initial period and a lower adverse selection in the last period in
Model 2 than in Kyle (1985) model. These results can generalize to the N-period case which
we will show numerically.
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4.2. The Limit Behavior When N →∞
Similarly, we need some preliminary results for the limit results, given by following.
PROPORSITION 4. The sequence {cn} in Theorem 3 can be achieved as follows. Given
cn , cn−1 is determined by the unique root lies in (0, 1) of equation
(1− c2n−1)cn(1 + c2n) = cn−1(1 + c2n−1)1/2(4.11)
with terminal values cN = 1. Moreover, the following monotonicity holds:
cN > cN−1 > · · · , cn > cn−1 > c2 > c1.(4.12)
With the Proposition 3, the limit of discrete equilibrium of Model 2 follows. Unlike in
Model 1, we focus on the first class of limits since the limit equilibrium exists.
THEOREM 4. When N → ∞, the sequences {an}, {bn} and {cn} in Theorem 3 have
limits:
lim
N→∞
c[Nt] = 0,(4.13)
lim
N→∞
b[Nt] =∞,(4.14)
lim
N→∞
a[Nt] =∞,(4.15)
for any t ∈ (0, 1). Moreover,
lim
N→∞
c[Nt]
∆t
1/2
N
=
1
(1− t)1/2 ,(4.16)
lim
N→∞
b[Nt]∆t
1/2
N =
1
2
(1− t)1/2,(4.17)
lim
N→∞
a[Nt]∆t
1/2
N =
1
2
(1− t)1/2.(4.18)
Insider dissipates her private information gradually, that is,
lim
N→∞
Σ[Nt] = (1− t)Σ0,(4.19)
lim
N→∞
λ[Nt] =
Σ
1/2
0
σu
,(4.20)
lim
N→∞
β[Nt]
∆tN
=
σu
(1− t)Σ1/20
.(4.21)
From Theorem 4, the discrete equilibrium results of Model 2 converge to the continuous
equilibrium results of Kyle (1985). Therefore, as trading happens more and more frequently,
the difference between equilibriums in discrete case when insider takes the pricing rule as can
20
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(a) Unrevealed information Σn.
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(b) Liquidity parameter λn.
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(c) Trading intensity βn.
Figure 4: Equilibriums in Model 2 and Kyle (1985) model when N=20.
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(a) Unrevealed information Σn with changing pe-
riod numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=100.
Figure 5: (Model 2) Numeric solutions of the unrevealed information Σn with one unit of
initial variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
and cannot be influenced disappears. This fact might stem form the continuity of liquidity
parameter when trading happens continuously in the sense the liquidity parameter that will
arise can be deduced accurately from the former level, regardless of whether or not insider
thinks she can influence it.
4.3. Numerical Results
Since the Model 2 has the same limit equilibrium as Kyle (1985), it is necessary to consider
the discrete case depicted numerically. Figure 4 shows that compared to Kyle (1985), the
insider in Model 2 trades more aggressively on private information (Figure 4(c)) and reveals
21
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ù ùúû ùúü ùúý ùúþ ùúß ùú ùú  ùú ùú û
û
ûúü
ûúþ
ûú
ûú
ü
üúü
üúþ
	 



















λ 
fffifl ffiff flff !""#$
fl# %& '
fl ffiff flff
(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=100.
Figure 6: (Model 2) numeric solutions of liquidity parameter λn with one unit of initial
variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
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(a) Intensity trading on private information βn with
changing period numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=100.
Figure 7: (Model 2) numeric solutions of intensity trading on private information βn with
one unit of initial variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
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more information by any time t > 0 (Figure 4(a)). The more aggressive trading in Model 2
induces a higher adverse selection for a long time, and then results in a slightly lower adverse
in the last few periods due to the less scale of unrevealed information (Figure 4(b). Note also
that λnσ
2
u represents the expected liquidity cost or informed profits in the nth period. Thus,
subfigure 4(b) implies that the insider in Model 2 can obtain a higher ex ante expectation
of total profits across all periods compared to that in Kyle (1985).
Figure 5(a) shows that the risk-neutral insider exploits her private information slowly, at
an almost constant speed even when there are only 5 trading opportunities. Additionally, a
large trading opportunity implies more information being revealed publicly.
Figure 6(a) indicates that the adverse selection curve is concave, in contrast to the convex
adverse selection curve in Model 1. Moreover, although the adverse selection is decreasing in
both models, the most decline here happens approaching the end of trading, while in Model
1 it happens in initial periods. Another difference is that here the larger trading opportunity
always results in a higher adverse selection before the end of trading, whereas it usually
implies a lower adverse selection in Model 1.
Figure 7(a) shows that, like Model 1, for each period number N , βn is increasing with
time going on, and in contrast to Model 1, with large trading opportunity, insider here would
like to trade more softly on private information than the case with small trading opportunity
for all periods except the last one.
Finally, Figures 5(b), 6(b), 7(b) show that when N is 100, the limit results obtained by
asymptotic analysis can characterize the actual discrete results well.
5. MODEL 3: THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE RISK-SEEKING INSIDER
MODEL
5.1. The Discrete Equilibrium
The risk-seeking insider in Model 3 behaves oppositely to the risk-averse insider in Model
1. The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium in discrete case of Model 3, with
insider’s strategies distinct from those in the former two models.
THEOREM 5. In Model 3 with trading period number N , a subgame perfect linear equi-
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librium exists. In this equilibrium, there are real numbers βn, λn, αn and Σn, such that:
xn = βn(v − pn−1)(5.1)
pn − pn−1 = λnyn(5.2)
Σn = var(v|y1, y2, · · · , yn)(5.3)
E(
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v) = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1(5.4)
The above real numbers βn, αn and Σn can be represented as:
δn = anσu∆tN
1/2Σn
1/2 (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1),(5.5)
αn = bnσu∆tN
1/2Σn
−1/2 (n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1),(5.6)
βn = cnσu∆tN
1/2Σn−1−1/2 (n = 1, 2, · · · , N).(5.7)
in which the sequences {an}, {bn}, {cn}, with terminal values aN−1 = 0, bN−1 = 12 , cN = 1,
are given recursively:
an−1 = an(
1
c2n + 1
)1/2 + bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2c2n(5.8)
bn−1 = bn(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2 +
cn
c2n + 1
(5.9)
− 3bncn + (c2n + 1)1/2(1− c2n) = 0(5.10)
where cn > 0, n = 1, 2, · · · , N .
From (5.10), we find that in the nth period, the insider’s trading intensity coefficient cn
is decreasing with the marginal risky profits estimated in the n+1th period bn. This reflects
the fact, in contrast to that in Model 1, the risk-seeking insider has an incentive to trade
less currently to keep more information for the next period, provided her with more ability
to earn risky profits in the next period.
Like the former 2 models, we can solve the equilibrium easily when N = 2. In Model 3,
we add an upper index (3) to the endogenous parameters. Calculations show:
α
(3)
0 ≈ 0.7587Σ0−1/2σu∆tN 1/2, δ(0)0 ≈ 0.0988Σ01/2σu∆tN 1/2.
Therefore, at the beginning of trading, the risk-seeking insider in Model 3 obtains larger
risky profits at the cost of smaller guaranteed profits relative to the Model 1, 2 and Kyle
(1985) model.
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5.2. The Limit Behavior When N →∞
Similarly, in Model 3, we have:
PROPORSITION 5. The sequence {cn} in Theorem 5 can be achieved as follows. Given
cn , cn−1 is determined by the unique root lies in (0, 1) of equation
1
cn−1
(c2n−1 + 1)
1/2(1− c2n−1) =
1
c2n + 1
(
1
cn
+ 2cn)(5.11)
with terminal values cN = 1. Moreover, the following monotonicity holds:
cN > cN−1 > · · · , cn > cn−1 > c2 > c1,(5.12)
and sequence {bn} has an expression of sequence {cn}
bn =
(c2n + 1)
1/2
3cn
(1− c2n).(5.13)
THEOREM 6. When N → ∞, the sequences {an}, {bn}, and {cn} in Theorem 5 have
limits:
lim
N→∞
c[Nt] = 0,(5.14)
lim
N→∞
b[Nt] =∞,(5.15)
lim
N→∞
a[Nt] =∞,(5.16)
for any t ∈ (0, 1). Moreover,
lim
N→∞
c[Nt]
∆t
1/2
N
=
√
3
3
1
(1− t)1/2 ,(5.17)
lim
N→∞
b[Nt]∆t
1/2
N =
√
3
3
(1− t)1/2,(5.18)
lim
N→∞
a[Nt]∆t
1/2
N =
√
3
6
(1− t)1/2.(5.19)
The insider exploits her private information slowly, that is,
lim
N→∞
Σ[Nt] = (1− t)1/3Σ0,(5.20)
lim
N→∞
λ[Nt] =
√
3Σ
1/2
0
3(1− t)1/3σu ,(5.21)
lim
N→∞
β[Nt]
∆tN
=
√
3σu
3(1− t)2/3Σ1/20
.(5.22)
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(a) Unrevealed information Σn with changing pe-
riod numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=20.
Figure 8: (Model 3) Numeric solutions of the unrevealed information Σn with one unit of
initial variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
As shown by Theorem 6, the information revealing speed, liquidity parameter and trading
intensity in limit are all increasing with calender time t. Compared to the corresponding
limit results in Kyle (1985) (or Model 2), the risk-seeking insider in model 3 always trades
less aggressively, always acquires larger risky profits( and smaller guaranteed profits at the
beginning of trading), and by any time t > 0 reveals less information. When t < 1 −
√
3
3
,
the adverse selection is lower than that in Kyle (1985) due to the low trading intensity while
when t > 1 −
√
3
3
, the adverse selection is higher than that in Kyle (1985) due to the large
scale of unrevealed information. Moreover, (5.18) and (5.19) imply that insider’s ability of
earning risky profits is about twice that of earning guaranteed profits, whereas it is “half”
in Model 1 and “equal to” in Model 2.
5.3. Numerical Results
Figure 8(a) depicts that the information released to price is of the least scale among our
three models by any time t > 0. At the initial periods, the decline speed is low and only
when time approaching the end, the speed is accelerated to exploit the large information
remained unrevealed. Actually, the risk-seeking insider would like to maintain her informa-
tion advantage to the end to acquire high future profits with high risk. These results are
actually implying the “waiting game” effect once investigated by Foster and Viswanathan
(1996) in which insiders make relatively small trades for the current periods and large for
future, with the hope that the others would push the price to a wrong direction in the future.
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(a) Liquidity parameter λn with changing period
numbers N = 5, N = 20, N = 100.
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(b) The approximation by limit results and the ac-
tual discrete results when N=20.
Figure 9: (Model 3) numeric solutions of liquidity parameter λn with one unit of initial
variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
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Figure 10: (Model 3) numeric solutions of intensity trading on private information βn with
one unit of initial variance of information, half unit of noise trader variance across all periods.
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By contrast, the motivation here is the risk-seeking behavior of a monopolistic insider while
it is the negative related signals endowed to competitive insiders there.
Figure 9(a) shows for each period number N , the adverse selection is increasing with
trades, and this is in sharp contrast to the other models with decreasing adverse selection.
This increase pattern is consistent with Figure 7(a)’s implication that most amount of the
private information is dissipated at the latter trading periods. Moreover, for a large N , the
market maker’s sensitivity to order flow is higher and the increasing is more pronounced.
Figure 10(a) shows for every N , insider’s trading intensity is increasing through all trading
periods. Specifically, βn is lower as more trading periods are added, different with that in
Model 1 and same with Model 2.
At last, Comments about Figures 8(b), 9(b), 10(b) refers to the other two models.
6. Conclusion
We improve the Kyle (1985) model by loosening the assumption of constant pricing rule.
By taking the effect insider’s strategy has on pricing rule into consideration, we present three
models vary with different risk attitudes of the insider.
Model 1 shows the risk-averse insider case, where the insider primarily maximizes the
guaranteed profits. In equilibrium, the insider trades in a way similar to that produced by
the “rat race” effect once depicted by Holden and Subrahamanyam (1992) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1996). When trades happens more and more frequently, the insider exploits
the private information at an exponential speed, yielding a strong-form efficient market
within any positive time. Model 2 focuses on the risk-neutral insider case, where the insider
primarily maximizes the ex ante expectation of profits. In the limit as period number goes to
infinity, Model 2 obtains exactly the continuous equilibrium in Kyle (1985). Model 3 presents
the risk-seeking insider case, where the insider primarily maximizes the risky profits. The
risk-seeking behavior motivates results similar to those by “waiting game” effect in Foster
and Viswanathan (1996) with large trades postponed and most information revealed in the
latter periods of trading.
Comparison among the three models shows: 1, As to the information revealing speed,
Model 1 is highest and Model 3 is lowest. This means that the more risk-averse one is, the
faster she will exploit her information advantage. 2, The coefficient of trading intensity that
increasing through trades for all the three models, implies the fact that the downward trend
of effect current trading has on the future with time going on is robust respect to various
risk attitudes. 3, The adverse selection is decreasing through trades in Model 1 and 2 with
a lower decreasing speed in Model 2, whereas it is increasing in model 3. This means that
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the more one is risk-seeking, the more likely relatively high adverse selection will be aroused
when trading ends up.
Appendix A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: (2.3) gives
λ
′
1(β1) =
Σ0[−β21Σ0 + σ2u∆tN ]
[β21Σ0 + σ
2
u∆tN ]
2
.
By the Proposition 1 in Huddart etal., (2001), we have β21Σ0 < σ
2
u∆tN . Hence, (2.5) holds.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Denote y˜1, y˜2 · · · , y˜N as the orthonormalization of se-
quence y1, y2 · · · , yN . Clearly, for each n, y˜n = βn(v − pn−1) + un. Thus by definitions, any
of Σk, λk, or pk (k = 1, · · · , N.) cannot be affected by bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) and cn, since they are
all determined by y˜k, k = 1, · · · , N .
Proof of the other conclusions need backward induction. In the last period, insider earns
E[πN |p1, · · · , pN−1, v] = E[xN (v − pN)|y1, · · · , yN−1, v]
= E[xN (v − pN−1 − λN y˜N)|y1, · · · , yN−1, v]
= βN(1− λNβN)(v − pN−1)2 + (bN (y1, · · · , yN−1) + cN)(1− λNβN)(v − pN−1).
Thus E[πN |p1, · · · , pN−1, v] has a formulation as (2.7) with
αN−1 = βN (1− λNβN), hN−1 = (bN (y1, · · · , yN−1) + cN)(1− λNβN), δN−1 = 0.
If the conclusions hold for n + 1th period, that is, there exists non-random real numbers
αn, hn, δn, such that
E(
N∑
k=n+1
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn, v) = αn(v − pn)2 + hn(v − pn) + δn,
and bn+1(y1, y2, · · · , yn), cn+1 can affect term hn, but cannot affect terms αn or δn. Then
stepping back by one period, we have:
E[
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, p2, · · · , pn−1, v] = E[
N∑
k=n+1
πk + (v − pn)xn|y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, v]
= E[αn(v − pn−1 − λny˜n)2 + hn(v − pn−1 − λny˜n) + δn + (v − pn−1 − λny˜n)xn|y1, y2, · · · , yn−1, v]
= [αn(1− λnβn)2 + βn(1− λnβn)](v − pn−1)2 + (bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) + cn + hn)(1− λnβn)
(v − pn−1) + δn + αnλ2nσ2u∆tN .
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Hence (2.7), with (2.8) - (2.10) holds for n. Thus, bn(y1, · · · , yn−1) and cn cannot affect
αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1 since they cannot affect price pn−1 or parameters αn, λn, δn in the
formulations (2.8) and (2.10). In conclusion, Proposition 2 holds.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Firstly, from (3.10), we have (3.25). Then substituting
for an and an−1 from(3.25) into (3.8), and rearranging yields
bn−1 = 2(
1
c2n + 1
)3/2(
c2n−1 + 1
2− c2n−1
)bn.(A.1)
Noting that both (A.1) and (3.9) are expressions for bn−1, their equivalency gives (3.24).
Substituting for bn and bn−1 from (3.24) into (3.9), and rearranging shows (3.22).
The monotonicity is verified as follows. Firstly, the equation (3.22) may be written as
(1− c2n−2/2)(1 + c2n−1)1/2
c2n−1
c2n−2
=
(1 + c2n−1)/cn−1
(1 + c2n)/cn
.(A.2)
A direct calculation shows cN−1 > 1 > cN−2 > cN−3. Secondly, suppose for a general n, the
inequality
cn−1 < cn < 1(A.3)
holds. Then claim that cn−2 < cn−1, otherwise cn−2 ≥ cn−1, a contradiction follows. In fact,
for (A.2), by (A.3), RHS > 1. But
LHS ≤ (1− c2n−1/2)(1 + c2n−1)1/2
c2n−1
c2n−2
≤ 1.
Thus, equation (A.2) cannot hold. In conclusion, by the backward induction, the mono-
tonicity (3.23) holds.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: There are three steps in this proof. In step one we show
that for any continuous time t ∈ (0, 1), in the limit as N → ∞, c[Nt] converges to zero
and both b[Nt] and a[Nt] converge to infinity. In step two, we give the convergence speeds of
a[Nt], b[Nt], c[Nt]. In step three, based on the former two steps, we give the characteristics of
limit behaviors for sequences {Σn}, {λn}, and {βn} as N →∞.
Step one: This step employs a method once used in the limit equilibrium in Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992). To emphasize the dependence, denote cn in economy with N periods
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by cNn . As seen from (3.22) in Proposition 3, the strategy coefficient c
N
n depends only on the
the remaining opportunity number N − n, that is
cNn = c
N+k
n+k for any natural numbers N, k, with n ≤ N.(A.4)
Combining this fact with the monotonicity property (3.23), we know
cNn is a decreasing function of N − n, with n 6 N − 1.(A.5)
Now, hold a particular time t ∈ (0, 1). For any subsequence of {1, 2, · · · , n, · · · }, we can
choose a sub-subsequence from it, denoted as N1, N2, · · · , Nk, · · · , such that4
Nk+1 −Nk > [Nk+1t]− [Nkt],(A.6)
then cNk[Nkt] is decreasing with k and hence has a limit as k →∞, denoted as ct. For the same
reason cNk[Nkt]−1 also has a limit, denoted as c
′
t. Claim that ct = c
′
t, and the proof follows. For
holden n0, as N →∞, cNn0 has a limit since it is decreasing with N . That is, for any ǫ > 0,
there exists N0, when N,N
′
> N0, we have
|cNn0 − cN
′
n0
| < ǫ.(A.7)
Accordingly, when k is big enough, such that Nk − [Nkt] + n0 > N0, then (A.4) and (A.7)
give
|cNkNkt − cNk[Nkt]−1| = |cNk−[Nkt]+n0n0 − cNk−[Nkt]+1+n0n0 | < ǫ.
From the arbitrariness of ǫ, we have ct = lim
k→∞
cNk[Nkt] = limk→∞
cNk[Nkt]−1 = c
′
t. Hence, the claim has
been proved. An examination of this proof shows lim
k→∞
cNk[Nkt]−2 = limk→∞
cNk[Nkt]−1 = limk→∞
cNk[Nkt] =
ct. Thus, when N →∞, substituting cn = cn−1 = cn−2 = ct into equation (3.22), we have
(1 + c2t )(2− c2t )c3t = 2(1 + c2t )1/2c3t
with a unique real root ct = 0. In conclusion,
lim
k→∞
cNk[Nkt] = 0.(A.8)
By the arbitrariness of subsequence we choose, (A.8) implies lim
N→∞
cN[Nt] = 0, i.e., (3.26) holds.
Further, from (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28) can be easily obtained from (3.24) and (3.25).
4 (A.6) can be satisfied since Nk − [Nkt] ≥ (1 − t)Nk →∞ as k →∞.
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Step two: In this step, it is crucial to find the speed of c
(N)
[Nt] converging to zero. To do
this, take the function ln on both sides of (3.22), and rearrange, yielding
3 ln cn−1 − 2 ln cn−2 − ln cn = 1
2
ln(1 + c2n−1)− ln(1 + c2n)− ln(1−
1
2
c2n−2).(A.9)
Define
dn = c
2
n, qn = ln cn.(A.10)
Then by Taylor expansion near zero ln(1 + x) = x− 1
2
x2 +O(x3), (A.9) can be written as
(A.11)
3qn−1 − 2qn−2 − qn = 1
2
(dn−1 − 1
2
d2n−1)− (dn −
1
2
d2n)− (−
1
2
dn−2 − 1
8
d2n−2)
+O(d3n−2 + d
3
n−1 + d
3
n).
Let
(A.12)
dn = dt∆t
β
N ,
dn−1 = (dt−∆tN∆t
β
N) = (dt − d
′
t∆tN )∆t
β
N +O(∆t
2+β
N ),
dn−2 = dt−2∆tN∆t
β
N ) = (dt − 2d
′
t∆tN )∆t
β
N +O(∆t
2+β
N ),
in which β is a parameter to be fixed later. By Taylor expansion near zero ln(1 + x) =
x+O(x2), (A.10) and (A.12) give
(A.13)
qn =
1
2
ln dn =
1
2
β ln∆tN +
1
2
ln dt,
qn−1 =
1
2
ln dn−1 =
1
2
β ln∆tN +
1
2
ln dt − 1
2
d′t
dt
∆tN +O(∆t
2
N),
qn−2 =
1
2
ln dn−2 =
1
2
β ln∆tN +
1
2
ln dt − d
′
t
dt
∆tN +O(∆t
2
N).
Substituting (A.13) into LHS of (A.11) and rearranging yields
LHS =
1
2
d′t
dt
∆tN +O(∆t
2
N).
Similarly,
RHS = −3
2
d′t∆t
1+β
N +
3
8
d2t∆tN
2β +O(∆t2+βN ) +O(∆t
3β
N ).
Equating LHS to RHS yields β = 1
2
, 1
2
d′t
dt
= 3
8
d2t . Combining this differential equation with
the terminal value dt|t=1 = ∞, we get dt = (23 11−t)1/2. In conclusion,
d[Nt]
∆t
1/2
N
→ dt (N → ∞),
and equivalently,
c[Nt]
∆t
1/4
N
=
d
1/2
[Nt]
∆t
1/4
N
→ (2
3
1
1− t)
1/4 (N →∞).
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This is exactly (3.29). (3.30) and (3.31) can be achieved from combining (3.29) (3.24) and
(3.25). For holden n, the limits of cn, bn, an as N →∞ correspond to t = 0 in (3.29)-(3.31)
respectively since n/N → 0.
Step three: Now, we take the limits of sequences {Σn}, {λn} and {βn} as N →∞ using
the former preliminary results. From (3.17) and (3.7),
Σn =
1
(1 + c2n)(1 + c
2
n−1) · · · (1 + c22)(1 + c21)
Σ0 = exp{−
n∑
i=1
ln(1 + c2i )}Σ0.
Thus, for t ∈ (0, 1), the monotonicity property of sequence {cn} implies (3.33). Note that c21
has order O(∆t
1/2
N ) from which we know as ∆tN → 0, exp{−ln(1 + c21)∆t−1N } → 0 and thus
(3.33) gives (3.32). From (3.16) and (3.7),
λn =
cnΣ
1/2
n−1
(1 + c2n)σu∆t
1/2
N
,
implying (3.34) and (3.35). Results about sequence {βn} can be deduced easily from (3.7).
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: In the last period, solutions are the same as those in Model
1, since for any strategy taken from XN , insider’s guaranteed profits are zero, and thus the
three models degenerate to the same one.
Suppose in the n+1th period, conclusions hold. Then, if the informed submission in nth
period is βn(v − pn−1), the profits accumulated from nth to the last period would be
E[
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, · · · , pn−1, v] = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1
with
αn−1 = αn(1− λnβn)2 + βn(1− λnβn), δn−1 = δn + αnλ2nσ2u∆tN .
Note that relationships (3.19) and (3.20) in Model 1 still hold in Model 2. Thus, by the law
of iterated expectation,
E(
N∑
k=n
πk) =
bnΣ
1/2
n−1σ
2
u∆tN
(β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN )1/2
+
βnΣn−1σ2u∆tN
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
+ anσ
2
u∆tN(
Σn−1
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
)1/2.
A tedious calculation gives
dE(
∑N
k=n πk)
dβn
=
−(an + bn)βnΣ3/2n−1σ2u∆tN
(β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN)3/2
+
Σn−1σ4u∆t
2
N − β2nΣ2n−1σ2u∆tN
(β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN)2
.
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Accordingly, the FOC yields
βn = cnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n−1(A.14)
with cn satisfying (4.10). While the SOC requires:
d2E(
N∑
k=n
πk)
dβn
2 = −(an + bn)Σ1/2n−1σ2u∆tN
(−2β2nΣ2n−1 + Σn−1σ2u∆tN )
(β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN)5/2
+
2β3nΣ
3
n−1σ
2
u∆tN − 6βnΣ2n−1σ4u∆tN 2
(β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN )3
< 0.
Substituting (A.14) into the above yields
−(an + bn)(−2c2n + 1)(c2n + 1)−
5
2 + (2c3n − 6cn)(c2n + 1)−3 < 0.(A.15)
Combined with (4.10), (A.15) can be satisfies by cn > 0 in our equilibrium. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: From (4.10), we have,
bn =
1− c2n
cn(1 + c2n)
1/2
− an.(A.16)
Substituting (A.16) into (4.8) yields
an−1 = an(
1
1 + c2n
)3/2 +
(1− c2n)cn
(1 + c2n)
2
.(A.17)
The sum of equation (4.9) plus (A.17) gives
an−1 + bn−1 = (an + bn)(
1
1 + c2n
)3/2 +
2cn
(1 + c2n)
2
.(A.18)
Substituting for an+bn and an−1+bn−1 from (4.10) into (A.18) and rearranging yields (4.11).
To show the monotonicity, change (4.11) to
1− c2n−1
cn−1(1 + c2n−1)1/2
=
1
cn(1 + c2n)
.(A.19)
Since the LHS of (A.19) is decreasing with cn−1, and the RHS is decreasing with cn, cn−1
can be considered as an increasing function of cn. Combined with another fact cN−1 < cN ,
this fact implies cN > cN−1 > · · · , > c2 > c1. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: The proof of (4.13) - (4.15) is similar to that in the step
one of Theorem 2 and is omitted. Take ln on both sides of (4.11), we have
ln(1− c2n−1) + ln cn + ln(1 + c2n) = ln cn−1 +
1
2
ln(1 + c2n−1).(A.20)
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By Taylor expansion near zero ln(1 + x) = x − 1
2
x2 + O(x3) and let cn = ct∆t
α, cn−1 =
ct−∆t∆tα = (ct − c′t∆tN +O(∆t2N))∆tα, (A.20) gives
− 3
2
[(ct − c′t∆tN +O(∆t2N))2∆t2αN ]−
1
4
(ct − c′t +O(∆tN)2)4∆t4αN + c2t∆t2αN −
1
2
c4t∆t
4α
N +O(∆t
6α
N )
= −c
′
t
ct
∆tN +
O(∆t2N)
ct
− 1
2
(−c
′
t
ct
∆tN +
O(∆t2N)
ct
)2 +O(−c
′
t
ct
∆tN +
O(∆t2N)
ct
)3 +O(∆t6αN )
which implies α = 1
2
, 1
2
c2t =
c
′
t
ct
. Combined with the terminal condition ct|t=1 = ∞, we have
ct =
1
(1−t)1/2 , i.e., (4.16) has been proved.
Now to show the limit result for sequence {bn}, let bn = bt∆tαN , bn−1 = bt−∆tN∆tαN =
(bt − b′t∆tN +O(∆t2N))∆tαN , and by Taylor expansions near zero (1 + x)k = 1+ kx+O(x2),
(4.9) gives
(−b′t +
3
2
btc
2
t )∆t
1+α
N − ct∆t1/2N +O(∆t3/2N ) +O(∆t2+αN ) = 0.
Thus, α = −1
2
, −b′t + 32c2t bt − ct = 0. Since bt|t=1 = ∞, (4.17) holds. Combined with (4.16)
and (4.17), (4.10) gives (4.18).
At last, show the other parameters’ limit results (4.19) - (4.21). As in Model 1, we have a
difference equation for sequence {Σn} : Σn−1−Σn = Σnc2n, which implies that the continuous
version of sequence {Σn} satisfies −dΣt = Σt 11−tdt and thus (4.19) holds. (4.20) and (4.21)
can be obtained similarly to those in Model 1. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5: Suppose in equilibrium, in the n+ 1th period, the conclu-
sions hold. Then strategy βn(v − pn−1) in the nth period implies
E[
N∑
k=n
πk|p1, · · · , pn−1, v] = αn−1(v − pn−1)2 + δn−1
with
αn−1 = αn(1− λnβn)2 + βn(1− λnβn), δn−1 = δn + αnλ2nσ2u∆tN .
The following relationship still holds:
αn−1(βn) = bnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n (
σ2u∆tN
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
)3/2 +
βnσ
2
u∆tN
β2nΣn−1 + σ2u∆tN
.(A.21)
Thus the FOC yields βn = cnσu∆t
1/2
N Σ
−1/2
n−1 with cn satisfying (5.10), and the SOC is
−3bn − (cn2 + 1)−1/2cn(1 + 3c2n) < 0.(A.22)
Combined with (5.10), (A.22) is satisfied since cn > 0 in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: Firstly, (5.13) yields from (5.10). Then substituting
for bn and bn−1 from (5.13) into (5.9) and rearranging yields (5.11). Denote the LHS of
(5.11) as f1(cn−1) RHS of it as f2(cn). Calculations show
df1(cn−1)
dcn−1
< 0,
df2(cn)
dcn
< 0.
Thus, cn−1, as a function of cn, is increasing with it. Combined this fact with cN > cN−1,
(5.12) holds. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 6: Firstly, (5.11) can be changed to
(c2n−1 + 1)
1/2(1− c2n−1)(c2n + 1)cn = (1 + 2c2n)cn−1.(A.23)
Let cn = ct∆t
α, cn−1 = ct−∆t∆tα = (ct − c′t∆tαN )∆tαN +O(∆t2+αN ). Then (A.23) implies
∆tα[−3
2
c3t∆t
2α + c′t∆t] +O(∆t
5α) +O(∆t3α+1) +O(∆t2+α) = 0,
from which, we have α = 1
2
, −3
2
c3t + c
′
t = 0. Combined with the terminal value ct|t=1 = ∞,
we know ct =
√
3
3
1
(1−t)1/2 , thus (5.17) is proved.
Now, show the limit results for sequences {bn}, {an}. From (5.13) and (5.17), we have
limit result for {bn}, i.e., (5.18). Further, (5.8) can be changed to
an−1(c2n + 1)
3/2 = an(c
2
n + 1) + bnc
2
n.
Let an = at∆t
a an−1 = at−∆t∆t
a = (at − a′t∆t)∆tα +O(∆t2+α). Similarly,
−a′t∆t1+a +
1
2
atc
2
t∆t
1+a +O(∆t2+a) =
√
3
9
1
(1− t)1/2∆t
1/2.
Which implies a = −1
2
, −a′t + 12atc2t =
√
3
9
1
(1−t)1/2 , and thus, at =
√
3
6
(1 − t)1/2, i.e., (5.19) is
proved. Calculations for continuous versions of sequences {Σn}, {λn} and {βn} are similar
to those in the former two models.
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